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WILLIAM ROBERT
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HUMAN, LIFE, AND OTHER SACRED STUFF

“L

ife is sacred stuff,” writes John Caputo as he affirms his theological
proposal for the weakness of God.1 God, according to Caputo, names
an event—or, more specifically, an event of naming that calls,
invokes, evokes, provokes, promises, affirms. It does so from the very beginning
(if not earlier), leading Caputo to avow hermeneutically “that the name of God is
inscribed in things from the start, that the world is marked by the hand of God,
that the world bears the stamp of a great and sweeping Yes.”2 This vocative
inscription takes place through this yes, which marks God’s creation as described
in Genesis as good: in repeatedly calling creation good, God effectively says yes
to creation. These divine daily affirmations support Caputo’s claim that creation,
particularly in Genesis 1, names a movement “from being to the good,” which
works in tandem with Caputo’s poetic-hermeneutic assertion that “Genesis is not
about being but about life.”3

Rather than a mighty sovereign power who creates ex nihilo by speaking, the
weak force of Caputo’s God only calls being into life, making the creation
narrative a story about life—a story that affirms life, as Caputo makes clear: “the
event that rings out in the name of God in the creation stories is to announce a
kind of covenant with life that we are asked to initial. We are asked to say ‘yes’
to life by adding a second yes to God’s ‘yes’ (Rosenzweig); to countersign God’s
yes with our yes...to embrace what God has formed and the elemental
undecidability in which God has formed or inscribed it.”4 This double yes, of
God and then of human beings, is Caputo’s account of religion, for religion
names a mutual agreement, signed and countersigned by yes; religion names, as
Caputo writes, “the point where our yes meets God’s, where our desire meets
God’s, where the bottomless abyss that opens up in the name of God meets the
bottomless abyss of our desire for God, where abyss meets up with
John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2006), 92.
2 Caputo, The Weakness of God, 89. Yes plays a central role in Caputo’s deconstructive
readings and deployments of Jacques Derrida’s work. See, for example, John D.
Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1997), esp. 63–66 and 255–262; and John D. Caputo, On
Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001), esp. 16–17 and 120–121. For one of Derrida’s
most pointed treatments of yes, see Jacques Derrida, “Nombre de oui,” in Derrida, Psyché:
Inventions de l’autre (Paris: Galilée, 1987), 639–650.
3 Caputo, The Weakness of God, 67, 58.
4 Caputo, The Weakness of God, 74. Rosenzweig’s interpretation of yes comes in Franz
Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. William W. Hallo (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1985), esp. 150–155.
1
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abyss....Abyss calls out to abyss.”5 In this way religion, like creation, turns on a
double yes—the (divine) call and (human) response of yes.
Creation, then, tells a story of life, a story in which God and human beings say
yes to life. This double yes recalls the name of God inscribed in creation by
marking and affirming what Caputo calls “a depth of meaning in life,” as the two
abysses signify “that life has an inviolability about it, a sacredness that it is the
role of the name of God to confer and confirm, to confirm and affirm, to affirm
and reaffirm” by repeating yes, by repeatedly saying yes to life.6 With this,
Caputo begins to unfold and unfurl his compact claim that “life is sacred stuff”
by divulging what it means for life to be sacred. Life’s sacredness involves its
“inviolability,” a holiness intrinsic to or hard-wired into life, so that life is sacred:
sacred is what life is, for “life is sacred stuff.” Furthermore, life is sacred
according to God and thanks to God’s yes that affirms and reaffirms its sacrality.
In saying yes to life (functionally equivalent, in terms of Genesis, to pronouncing
creation good), God says yes to life’s sacredness. The name of God thus reveals
and performs its fundamental and constitutive role vis-à-vis life—which is also
to say, vis-à-vis creation—by repeating this yes. Life is sacred on God’s account,
on account of God’s yes (and reaffirmingly countersigned by a human yes).
To what life, to whose life, do God and human beings say yes? Read quickly,
Caputo’s avowal (“life is sacred stuff”) could seem to restate a foundational
premise of humanism, particularly given that human beings are the ones who
countersign God’s yes with their own yes. For that matter, a quick reading of this
statement could seem to echo the motivating tenet of anti-abortion groups,
particularly Catholic ones that closely follow John Paul II’s encyclicals
concerning human life. This kind of cursory reading would depend upon the
adjective “human” invisibly preceding Caputo’s statement as a modifier of “life.”
Humanism asserts that human life is indeed sacred stuff, thanks to human beings’
position atop an ontological hierarchy. Even a less assertive (perhaps a weaker?)
humanism, such as Dominique Janicaud’s “preventive humanism,” must claim
that human life is sacred stuff in its effort to stave off or defend against what
Janicaud calls “barbaric regressions” that reduce human to inhuman, as in the
Nazi extermination camps or in terrorist attacks.7
Caputo’s affirmation that “life is sacred stuff” ultimately does not fall prey to
such rapid readings and their all-too-easy reductions to humanism. This
becomes clear by considering Caputo’s statement in its textual context, amid a
hermeneutically creative reading of the creation stories in Genesis. Following
Catherine Keller, Caputo emphatically emphasizes the key roles that the
elements play in these stories—roles that make untenable any account of creatio
ex nihilo, particularly given the weak force of God that Caputo articulates. The
powerless power of this God lies in a promise, as Caputo explains:
Caputo, The Weakness of God, 89.
Caputo, The Weakness of God, 92.
7 Dominique Janicaud, On the Human Condition, trans. Eileen Brennan (New York:
Routledge, 2005), 57.
5
6
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The promise that Elohim inscribes upon creation gives words to a
depth of meaning in life, affirming the sacredness of the least thing,
and it adds an infinite depth to the protest against violence and the
violation of life. Life is sacred stuff, arising from elements of
bottomless and dark depths, from deep and dark and salty seas
upon which Elohim has breathed. Life springs up from an antique
turmoil that trembled with possibility and the future.8
This inscription takes place in what Caputo calls “the flux,” which names “the
element in which things are inscribed, the space in which they are forged, the
indeterminacy that is built right into whatever gets built....The flux explains the
eventiveness in things. It is not only why things are able to fall apart, but why
they are able to have a future.”9
Caputo thus refuses an easy, quick reading that would reduce his statement to a
humanistic refrain. By “affirming the sacredness of the least thing” following
from God’s promise, Caputo makes clear that the life that is sacred stuff is not
limited to human life but to all of life, in its multiform manifestations. In
responding affirmatively to the call of the divine yes, human beings say yes to life
in general, so that their affirmation is ecological rather than egological. It is,
moreover, elemental since creation takes place in and through the (pre-existing)
elements that God calls to life. All of creation is fashioned from these elements,
in the flux of the tohu wa-bohu and the tehom, pointing to the materiality that
serves as the medium for life, which is why Caputo insists that “life is sacred
stuff.” “Stuff” signifies not a rhetorical flourish but a substantiality that remains
elemental to created life, for in Caputo’s words, created, living beings “are
formed of an indeterminate and fluctuating stuff,” “made of humus, of tohu wabohu and tehom,” and the flux inscribed in these elements ensures “this
indeterminacy that makes them unpredictable and inventive” as well as marks
“a certain limit on God’s power.”10 In saying yes to life, then, human beings
affirm the stuff of life, the stuff that they themselves are as material, embodied
creatures—the same stuff that composes all of creation in its elemental
materiality.
In saying yes, they thereby short circuit any quasi-humanistic
attempt to position human beings atop the created order. Human beings boost
this short circuiting by saying yes to what Caputo terms “our khoral corporeality,
our khora-poreality, our khoral incarnation.”11 This embodied affirmation, this
yes to embodiment and materiality, underscores that the life that is sacred stuff
remains material, physical, created, formed and reformed, affirmed and
reaffirmed, according to its fundamentally elemental nature. This yes implicitly

Caputo, The Weakness of God, 92; see also 80. For Keller’s theology of creation
stemming from a rereading of Genesis, see Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology
of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003).
9 Caputo, The Weakness of God, 82; see also 58–62 and 71–72.
10 Caputo, The Weakness of God, 72.
11 Caputo, The Weakness of God, 80; see also 56–64 and 274–276, where Caputo expounds
on khōra.
8
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affirms Caputo’s insistence that creation, particularly the creation story that
Genesis tells, is about life.
This invocative expedition into Caputo’s case for the weakness of God as a
theological opening itself opens and makes way for a kind of theological
anthropology, or anthropology of the sacred, that emphasizes the weakness of
human being and the elemental indeterminacy of life, particularly in relation to
the sacred. Caputo’s provocative affirmation that “life is sacred stuff” opens and
makes way for a relational reconsideration of “the human” and “the sacred,” of
homo and sacer, framed by Caputo’s hermeneutic turn that, as he writes, shifts
emphasis in Genesis (and in the creation it narrates) “back from power to
goodness, back from being to life”—a life fashioned “out of desert and deep.”12
Caputo moves toward this reconsideration already in suggesting that “life is
sacred stuff” and, in doing so, weaving together life and sacrality by defining the
former in terms of the latter: life is sacred. But what does this mean? What does
it mean to be sacred? Is life sacred because it is composed of the elements, which
“predate” creation? Is life sacred because it is fashioned by God, who calls these
elements to life?
The hermeneutic indeterminacy of what it means for life to be sacred, to be
sacred stuff, points to (or perhaps owes to) a hermeneutic indeterminacy in
“sacred,” making it both possible and necessary to excavate two semantic orders
in which “sacred” operates. The first-order sense of “sacred” is topographical:
“sacred” means set apart, uncommon, out of the ordinary, special.13 Naming
something as “sacred” therefore positions it in a different space, beyond the
bounds of the profane; such a naming performs a speech act that sets apart
whatever it calls “sacred.” In this first order, “sacred” designates something
extra-ordinary. It denotes position and can effect a repositioning. “Sacred” thus
stands as a marker of difference; it marks difference descriptively, based on
topographical position. The second-order sense of “sacred” adds an evaluative
dimension to this description: once something is named “sacred” and marked as
different, a second move assigns a valence based on a judgment of value. In this
second order, “sacred” often takes on a positive connotation, identifying
something not only as different but as particularly valuable because of its
difference. The second-order sense creates in this way a hermeneutic hierarchy
in which “sacred” stands as a privileged term against its lower counterpart of
less value, “profane.”
Caputo uses “sacred” in this second-order way, for in maintaining that “life is
sacred stuff,” he makes an evaluative claim. Affirming that “life is sacred stuff”

Caputo, The Weakness of God, 87.
This is Jonathan Z. Smith’s contention, as he asserts that someone or something
“becomes sacred by having attention focused on it in a highly marked way. From such
a point of view, there is nothing that is inherently sacred or profane. These are not
substantive categories, but rather situational ones. Sacrality is, above all, a category of
emplacement.” See Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 105.

12
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affirms life’s high value because it is sacred, and Caputo makes this affirmation
as a way of insisting on a high valuation of life. This second-order valuation
reinforces its first-order differentiation: because life is so highly valued, so
special in a “positive” sense, life is and should be distinguished as different and
as extraordinary in an ethically charged way. For Caputo, life’s extraordinary
valuation gives life its inviolability, its holiness, its depth of meaning, all of
which the name of God confers and confirms repeatedly. Caputo avoids the
sacred hierarchy of value that leads humanism to identify human being as the
most sacred because most valuable, but he cannot completely avoid a biologic or
zoologic privilege already implicit in his shift of emphasis from creation to life.
Life, he asserts, is sacred stuff, which accords a privilege to living over nonliving
creation, even though all of creation is fashioned from the same elements.
Thanks to this assertion, Caputo positions himself and his theology of divine
weakness at one end of a “sacred” spectrum—a spectrum that has occupied a
prime place in the study of religion for at least the last century. Caputo stands
on the edge of the second-order valuation of sacred in “positive” terms, as what
is most or even absolutely valuable. (His position might owe in large degree to
the explicit and self-conscious nature of his project as theological and thus as
normative rather than merely descriptive, which raises a question about the
viability of including Caputo under this broad banner of “the study of religion.”)
At the other end of this “sacred” spectrum stands Giorgio Agamben, though he
would strongly endorse Caputo’s contention that “life is sacred stuff.” But his
endorsement comes for very different reasons given their divergences
concerning the sacred and its relation to life. While Caputo’s sense of sacrality
owes to the elemental nature of the “stuff” of creation and its fabrication by
divine call, Agamben’s sense of sacrality remains strictly secular, consciously and
completely divorced from any religious sense. Agamben carefully avoids any
second-order sacred ambivalence of the kinds that organize the works of William
Robertson Smith, Sigmund Freud, Marcel Mauss, Émile Durkheim, and Roger
Caillois, among others. These men are, according to Agamben, “still heavily
weighed down by a scientific mythologeme,” namely, “the theory of the
ambivalence of the sacred” based largely on systems of taboo.14 Such systems
entwine structural oppositions, such as pure and impure, so that, in Durkheim’s
words, there are “two kinds of sacred things” with “no clear border” dividing
the two, allowing an object to “pass from one to the other without changing
nature. The impure is made from the pure, and vice versa. The ambiguity of the
sacred consists in the possibility of this transmutation.”15 Agamben considers
this supposed ambiguity the result of a historically located semantic slide in
which a legal figure began to resonate in a religious discourse due to an

14 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel HellerRoazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 75.
15 Émile Durkheim qtd. in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 78. Elsewhere I discuss at greater
length the relation of Durkheim and Agamben regarding the sacred (particularly as a
transcendental signifier).
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overburdening of meaning. In this way, “sacred” became an excessive signifier
that, having meant too much, finally meant nothing—nothing but this excess.
Excavating and exposing this slide requires that Agamben return to ancient
Rome, in which this legal figure emerged. The figure is homo sacer, sacred man,
whom Pompeius Festus describes as “the one whom the people have judged on
account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man [neque fas est eum
immolari], yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide....This is why
it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.”16 Here, Festus
articulates both first-order and second-order meanings of “sacred.” The firstorder, topographical positioning as sacred owes to a criminal judgment—a
judgment that sets apart homo sacer and, in doing so, makes him sacer and marks
him as fundamentally different. This judgment is, legally and ethically, a
“negative” one since it ascribes “sacred” to “a bad or impure man,” so that
“sacred” names not the most valuable but the least valuable or the valueless. In
this sense, to rearticulate Caputo’s claim that “life is sacred stuff” would be to
denigrate or denegate any possible, “positive” value that life might have.
Instead, “life is sacred stuff” would function more like a curse than a blessing,
more like a condemnation than an exaltation, with “sacred” itself functioning as
a denial of value rather than an affirmation of value.
In the ancient Roman legal context to which Agamben returns, the sovereign is
the one who pronounces this curse or condemnation of sacrality. The law
endows the sovereign with the power to decide and declare that someone is
sacred. This he does through a speech act, “sacer esto,” whose utterance
performatively enacts this inscriptive designation of sacredness. For Agamben,
as for ancient Romans, “sacred” is a political and not a religious designation
made by a secular sovereign. This key claim explicitly opposes Agamben to
Caputo: while for the latter sacredness operates as a function of divine, elemental
creation, for the former sacredness operates in an exclusively political capacity.
Agamben interprets (in his words) “sacratio as an autonomous figure” in an effort
“to uncover an originary political structure that is located in a zone prior to the
distinction between sacred and profane, religious and judicial.”17 On this
account, sacrality is pre-religious—and hence non-religious as well as nonambivalent. Agamben finds support for this claim in Festus’ neque fas est eum
immolari, which he reads as a passage that, he writes, “served precisely to
distinguish the killing of homo sacer from ritual purifications and decisively
excluded sacratio from the religious sphere in the strict sense.”18
With this decisive exclusion of sacratio from the religious sphere comes a double
turn toward or double passage through humanism, and this humanistic specter
haunts Agamben’s account of homo sacer, of humanity and sacrality and of their
relation. First, moving back from and before religion into a rigidly delimited and
strictly secular political domain effectively encloses human being, allowing
Pompeius Festus cited in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 71.
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 74.
18 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 81.
16
17
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humanism to assert itself and its version of human existence as autonomous, selfgrounding, self-certain, free, unique, and (implicitly) superior to other modes of
being. According to humanism, human beings are special, different—in other
words, sacred. But their “positive” sacredness comes thanks to a selfsacralization, according to which human beings deem themselves to be sacred by
effectively pronouncing “sacer esto” over themselves. Self-sacralization is a selfdefeating proposition: delimiting itself so as to delimit itself, distinguishing itself
so as to distinguish itself, the human marking the human as human. The sacred
requires some form of alterity, without which it cannot designate difference and
thus loses its differential meaning. Sacralization cannot be reflexive—except
perhaps in some sort of auto-affective Hegelian dream whose realization would
be nightmarish.
Second, sacredness results from a human sovereign’s “sacer esto” performatively
pronounced in a political sphere prior to religion and any distinction between the
religious and the juridicial. However, to say “sacer esto,” to call someone sacred,
performs a double function that excludes him or her from two legal orders. It
imposes on him, or her, a double ban through which he or she is abandoned by
human and divine law. By being permitted to be killed, homo sacer does not
enjoy and cannot appeal to the protection of human law forbidding homicide.
By being prohibited from sacrifice, homo sacer is removed from the divine law
governing the economy of sacrifice. But this second ban, this exception to divine
law, is enacted by the human sovereign from within an explicitly political (i.e.
non-religious) domain. That a human sovereign could make an exception to
divine law requires a humanistic hubris that positions the human sovereign
“above” the divine, able to decide on religious matters with authority and
finality from the civil sphere. Sacer therefore designates what Agamben
identifies as “a life that may be killed by anyone—an object of a violence that
exceeds the sphere both of law and of sacrifice,” and “this double excess opens
the zone of indistinction between and beyond the profane and the religious.”19
II.
Homo sacer dwells in this zone of indistinction opened by a double excess—this
zone “between and beyond.”
“Beyond” here resonates with Janicaud’s
humanistic beyond, which serves as the backbone and telos of his philosophical
project: “to reflect upon the sense (or non-sense) of this potential ‘beyond’”
engendered by his conception of humanity as “the unfathomable overcoming of
its limits,” making the human “the being who continually exceeds the frontiers of
his field of action.”20 Such overcoming does not, however, lead human being out
of or past its humanity, since for Janicaud “the overcoming of the human is a
myth,” because “man is himself an overcoming.”21 Overcoming entails not an
ecstatic exceeding of human bounds but a reflexive returning and reshaping of
those bounds in response to the call of the superhuman and in self-defense from
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 86.
Janicaud, On the Human Condition, 2, 4, 30.
21 Janicaud, On the Human Condition, 54.
19
20
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the inhuman, an ever-looming threat. Janicaud calls this “a paradoxical
‘economy’” that combines “a cautious humanism, warning against the inhuman
or the subhuman, and an opening up to possible superhumans (or everything
other than the human ‘all too human’: disturbing, strange, radically creative) that
lie dormant in us. On the one hand, the defense of the human against the
inhuman, on the other, the illustration of what surpasses the human in man.”22
Human being thus lies between—between inhuman and superhuman, between
beast and angel—and it is in this space between that humanity can go beyond via a
reflexive, self-transforming self-transcendence.
Such self-transcendence relies on a characteristically humanistic understanding
of freedom or liberty that implicitly depends upon human autonomy and selfdetermination. Agamben’s sovereign demonstrates this same kind of autonomy
and self-determination in terms not of individual but of political and “human”
reflexivity, so that human beings (are free to) decide on their own human being,
their own humanity. Humanity, then, is a matter of decision—of attribution or
appellation. Humanity is a call that echoes in a different register Caputo’s
conception of God as a call, which Caputo describes as, “the name of an event
rather than of an entity, of a call rather than of a cause, of a provocation or a
promise rather than a presence.”23 Dwelling “between and beyond,” “the
human” becomes a name characterized, like Caputo’s God, by weakness, frailty,
fragility thanks to the human limitations of finitude and mortality. Constituted
in and through the flux, humanity is open to destruction, but also to remaking,
reconfiguring, reinventing, for the indeterminate flux grants to creation the twin
potentialities of failure and futurity. This is why, as Caputo writes, “the work of
creation can be continued by humankind in a work of continuous re-creation.
The ability of a thing to be reinvented and to surpass itself goes hand in hand
with its vulnerability to destruction, which is all part of the risk” of material
life.24 This possibility for reinvention, reconfiguration, recreation remains
bounded by the weakness, frailty, fragility, and finitude that characterize human
being. The name “human” or “humanity” can call only a material life
aporetically framed by mortal limitation yet open to an unforeseeable future that
remains (as Caputo repeatedly emphasizes) à-venir, to come.
Affirming humanity as the name of this call that calls forth humanity’s
constitutive weakness and fragility and mortality carries with it an affirmation of
human ontology as becoming rather than being, fluid rather than formed, in flux
rather than static. These affirmations undercut and uproot humanism’s picture
of an autonomous, free, self-determining human existence—a human existence
reflexively self-sacralized as an endowing of absolute value in a realm
sovereignly ruled by human beings. Agamben’s pre-religious, political notion of
sacredness dreams this humanistic dream (awake or asleep, consciously or
unconsciously), for his configuration of the political domain requires this kind of
Janicaud, On the Human Condition, 58; see also 47 and 56.
Caputo, The Weakness of God, 12.
24 Caputo, The Weakness of God, 82; see also 105, where Caputo reflects on “perhaps”
(peut-être).
22
23
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self-enclosed humanistic vision. This political matrix depends upon an implicit
humanism in defining sacrality and, subsequently, humanity. But this sort of
humanism turns out to be antihuman in denying that which is called to life by
“humanity,” namely, weakness, frailty, fragility, finitude, mortality—all of which
remain bound to materiality and elemental creation.25 This sort of humanism
refuses to admit the contingent vitality and unforeseeable indeterminacy of
embodied, corporeal (or, as Caputo suggests, khora-poreal) life. Such a refusal
thus refuses the “stuff” of “life” that Caputo deems “sacred” when he affirms
that “life is sacred stuff.” Only a vital position—one that, vis-à-vis this
humanism, would be antihumanistic—can affirm that “life is sacred stuff” and,
in doing so, affirm a bio-political human existence that admits life, in all of its
contingency and fragility, into the political domain. This admission unseals and
unseats a political self-enclosure by relinquishing authoritarian control over
living and dying.
To relinquish such control would displace the sovereign’s sovereignty and, with
it, his power to pronounce “sacer esto” as a double legal suspension—one that, by
sovereign decree, positions homo sacer “between and beyond” human and divine
laws. It would undermine the explicitly and solely political character of
sacredness, which performs a necessary buttressing of Agamben’s argument
given its assertion that the life of homo sacer “has an eminently political character
and exhibits an essential link with the terrain on which sovereign power is
founded.”26 This becomes clear in the figure of “bare life” (nuda vita) or sacred
life, the life of homo sacer, which is produced when life enters the polis. This life is
not life in general but zoē, an ancient Greek name that (Agamben writes)
expresses “the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or
gods),” to be distinguished from bios, the ancient Greek term indicating “the
form or way of living proper to an individual or a group.”27 On Agamben’s
account, zoē breaks free of its imprisonment in the oikos and enters the polis, and
that entry marks the transformation of politics into biopolitics as well as what
Agamben calls “the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power,”
leading him to claim that “the production of bare life is the originary activity of
sovereignty.”28 Bare life is therefore a sovereign production: the sovereign
stands as the one who pronounces “sacer esto” and turns life into bare life or sacred
life. Agamben underscores this, writing that “sacredness is instead the originary
form of the inclusion of bare life in the juridical order, and the syntagm homo
On this score, Emmanuel Levinas writes that “humanism has to be denounced only
because it is not sufficiently human.” See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or
Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1998),
128.
26 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 100.
27 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 1.
28 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 6, 83, emphasis added. It is worth noting that though
Agamben here follows and even amplifies Michel Foucault’s claim that politics becomes
biopolitics in the modern West, he later asserts that “in its origin Western politics is also
biopolitics.” For this later claim, see Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal,
trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 80; see also Agamben,
Homo Sacer, 3–7, for Agamben’s discussion of Foucault.
25
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sacer names something like the originary ‘political’ relation, which is to say, bare
life insofar as it operates in an inclusive exclusion as the referent of the sovereign
decision. Life is sacred only insofar as it is taken into the sovereign exception”
and, in being so taken, is exposed to death through the permissible potentiality
of homicide as an exception to the law, without criminal repercussions imposed
by the sovereign.29
For Agamben, then, life becomes “sacred stuff” only through its explicit
exposure to death by sovereign pronouncement within the political sphere. Life
is not sacred but becomes sacred thanks to a sovereign decision that politicizes zoē
by turning it into bare life or sacred life. Thus life becomes sacred as a result of a
political calculation that decides on the value and status of life by deciding
whether to expose this life to death. Here again, Agamben’s subterranean
humanism emerges, as he seems to maintain firmly that life’s exposure to death
takes place in and through, and only in and through, a sovereign decision. In
doing so, he sustains the implicit, humanistic hubris according to which life
becomes solely a matter of human, political calculation, so that only a politically
calculated decision (of, in this case, a human sovereign) could expose life to
death—as if life, in its very fragility and contingency and unforeseeable indeterminacy,
were not always already exposed to the possibility of death at every moment, as if life did
not amount to an existential mode of being as being-exposed. Agamben neglects to
calculate the vital risk under which material, embodied life exists, for its
unforeseeable futurity that remains à-venir thereby remains incalculable. In
short, he neglects to consider fully the “stuff” of life (or, for him, the “stuff” of
zoē) that is mortal. His humanistic strain leads him to conceive of life
conceptually, according to a neat, philosophical division of zoē and bios, and to
forget the messy, unpredictable, fluid fleshiness of embodied living that cannot
be completely contained or controlled by any human sovereign. Agamben
collapses zoē’s politicization with rigidification, particularly in the wake of a
sovereign’s “sacer esto” that, in pronouncing this curse that makes a life sacred,
also conceptually turns this life to stone (so that the sovereign becomes a kind of
politicized Medusa), which Agamben acknowledges in describing homo sacer as,
“so to speak, a living statue.”30
This petrification keeps human life from the flux that characterizes the risky
contingency of its corporeality, whose becoming proceeds through an immanent
exposure to the ever-present potentiality of death. Humanity and “the human,”
the homo of homo sacer, remain a sovereign decision, a matter of political
calculation, as Agamben states explicitly: “in the ‘politicization’ of bare life—the
metaphysical task par excellence—the humanity of living man is decided.”31
Humanity is decided upon by the sovereign in and through the decision
concerning sacrality (and both decisions are final), for to be declared sacred
renders a political subject “between and beyond” the bounds of humanity insofar
29 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 85. Agamben uses the terms “bare life” and “sacred life”
interchangeably.
30 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 99.
31 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8.
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as bare life or sacred life is inhuman. Indeed, the zone of indistinction
demarcated by bare life or sacred life—a zone of indistinction between zoē and
bios—is also a zone of indistinction between human and animal (which helps to
explain or justify the double exception according to which homo sacer may be
killed but may not be sacrificed). Homo sacer is abandoned not only by law
(human and divine) but by humanity, since in becoming an outlaw homo sacer
also becomes a loup garou, a werewolf, a wolf-man. In becoming sacred, homo
sacer becomes what Agamben describes as “a monstrous hybrid of human and
animal,” not simply a wolf but a wolf-man, since the zone of bare life or sacred
life is, in Agamben’s words, “a threshold of indistinction and of passage between
animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion” or “a zone of
indistinction and continuous transition between man and beast, nature and
culture.”32
Furthermore, this indistinction, taking place in a threshold or caesura, threatens
the very possibility of culture and, with it, the ground upon which the decision
regarding humanity is (sovereignly) made. In this way, the zone of sacrality, this
space of indistinction between zoē and bios and between animal and human,
represents what Agamben calls “a critical threshold,” for if the border between
human and animal collapses and the difference between human and animal
becomes undifferentiated, then culture and all that it carries with it (including
politics and, therefore, the decision regarding humanity) threaten to vanish.33
Consequently, Agamben announces that “the boundary between man and
animal marks the boundary of an essential domain,” one fundamental to the
possibility and shape of human being, as its determination and maintenance
enables “a fundamental metaphysico-political operation in which alone
something like ‘man’ can be decided upon and produced”—produced in and
through the sovereign production of bare life, itself produced by virtue of
sacratio.34 Here, Agamben states explicitly that politics, which he marks off as an
originary domain prior to religious/juridical or sacred/profane distinctions, is
metaphysics, so that politics becomes first philosophy for Agamben. He
underscores this political priority in acknowledging that first philosophy, or
ontology (concerned with questions of being), is “in every sense the fundamental
operation in which anthropogenesis, the becoming human of the living being, is
realized” (anthropogenesis being “what results from the caesura and articulation
between human and animal”).35
In so doing, he reveals that his ardent defense of sacratio as an unambivalent,
originary political structure that is pre-religious and pre-juridcal does not finally
hold. As first philosophy, politics performs a foundational function that anchors,
opens, and inaugurates existential possibilities of being (or, as Martin Heidegger
would say, being-in-the-world) and subsequent decisions on the sacrality and
humanity of living beings. But it can perform this function only thanks to an
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 105, 109.
Agamben, The Open, 21; see also Agamben, Homo Sacer, 98.
34 Agamben, The Open, 21.
35 Agamben, The Open, 79; see also 38.
32
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implicit, prior decision concerning what counts as human upon which politics (as
a human cultural form) depends. Moreover, this decision is humanist, always
already having decided in favor of humanism, with its defining image of “the
human” that includes sharp and uncrossable divisions hermetically sealing “the
human” in an enclosed political sphere. It seems plausible that Agamben’s
refusal of religion in favor of politics might owe to the sense of alterity and
uncontrollable otherness characteristic of occidental monotheisms and their
theological conceptions—strong or weak—of God. This refusal, however, forces
Agamben to embrace and adopt, silently and below the surface, a neo-classical
humanism that, in its attempt to displace religion, is itself ultimately displaced.
This displacement becomes clear when homo sacer, the figure through which
Agamben intertwines sacrality and humanity, is put to the test.
III.
Enter Antigone. The more difficult daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta, the product
of an incestuous union that violates kinship taboos, she is problematic from the
start. Her problematic nature intensifies when she refuses to abide by the edict
of Creon, her uncle and king of Thebes, prohibiting the burial of her brother
Polyneices’ corpse. After burying it twice (with no help from her sister, Ismene)
and getting caught in the act, Antigone stands trial before Creon, resolutely
defiant in her adherence to the ritual duties of filial piety that obligate a sister to
bury a brother, regardless of a sovereign’s political proclamation. For her “crime
of reverence” and for her lack of remorse, Creon sentences Antigone to be buried
alive. After receiving wise counsel from Haemon, his son, and Tiresias, a blind
prophet, the inflexible Creon finally bends and sets out to release Antigone from
her living entombment—only to find her dead, having hanged herself in her
crypt. This disturbing revelation leads to the suicides of Haemon and then
Eurydice, Creon’s wife, leaving Creon alone and broken at the end of Sophocles’
tragic drama.
Antigone tests Agamben’s conception of homo sacer by pushing notions of
humanity and sacrality to their limits, where the possible touches the impossible.
Her test results underscore and undercut his configuration of homo sacer and the
relation of humanity and sacrality that it weaves, for Antigone is both
paradigmatic and enigmatic with respect to homo sacer.
Antigone exemplifies the first-order, topographical designation of “sacred” (as
set apart, extraordinary, different) as the corporealization of incest: she is the
result of incest, so that her father is also her brother and her mother also her
grandmother. She embodies a violation of a founding cultural and definitively
“human” structure, namely, kinship, which takes the prohibition of incest as its
starting point. She further accentuates her sacred difference by bearing an
incestuous, erotic desire for her dead brother Polyneices—an erōs that crosses
and contaminates her (purportedly) “pure” and appropriate philia, which
motivates and mobilizes her duty to bury his corpse. (Her death-bound
determination to bury his corpse at all costs could be read as Antigone’s
demonstrative affirmation of Caputo’s assertion that “life is sacred stuff,”
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particularly insofar as life always and constitutively carries with it the immanent
potentiality of death. But such an affirmation already moves Antigone into the
second-order, valuative dimension of “sacred.”)
Hence Antigone remains from the beginning in a state of exception, a kind of
homo sacer, as the inclusive exclusion that makes possible culture and its
conditioned calculation regarding what counts as “human.”36 Antigone starts
“between and beyond” the nature/culture and physis/nomos distinctions, which
also positions her “between and beyond” the human/animal divide. She stands
in Agamben’s “critical threshold,” the caesura between humanity and animality
where the two become indistinguishable. She becomes a monstrous hybrid,
neither human nor animal yet implicated in both; she embodies traces of the
human and the inhuman at once. This hybridity is made manifest by the guard
who reports to Creon that when Antigone discovers Polyneices’ uncovered body
(after she had buried it once), “she gave a shrill cry like a bird when she sees her
nest / empty, and the bed deserted where her nestlings had lain.”37 The chorus
confirms this characterization of her as human-animal hybrid by calling her
“wild”—indeed, “as wild by birth as her father,” implying that her nature
ensures her status as an outlaw in Agamben’s biopolitical sense.38 Antigone also
confirms the guard’s analysis by admitting that “I have no place with human
beings, / living or dead. No city is home to me.”39 She self-consciously accepts
her position as an outlaw who, dwelling in a zone of indistinction (or state of
exception) between human and animal, can never be at home in the political
domain—the domain that, on Agamben’s account, determines and decides on
“the human.”
Antigone’s admission further embeds her in this zone of indistinction,
confirming her status as homo sacer, by positioning her not only “between and
beyond” the human/animal distinction but also “between and beyond” the
border separating life and death.
Confirmation comes in Creon’s
pronouncement of her sentence, which functions as a sovereign “sacer esto.” This
marks her double exclusion from the polis and doubly ensures that the curse of
her sacrality precludes her possible humanity. It doubly marks her as homo sacer,
who inhabits bare life as a life exposed to death—a life that, by Antigone’s
account, is always already exposed to death. In other words, Antigone is already

Claude Lévi-Strauss bases his structural considerations of kinship around his
identification of incest as what he calls “the fundamental step” by which “the transition
from nature to culture is accomplished.” See Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary
Structures of Kinship, ed. Rodney Needham, trans. James Harle Bell and John Richard
Von Sturmer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 24.
37 Sophocles, Antigone, trans. Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 424–425. All
citations from Antigone give line numbers that correspond in English and Greek.
Interestingly, and quite tellingly, in the guard’s report the breakdown of the humananimal distinction crosses and couples with the breakdown of kinship distinctions, as
exemplified by Antigone, the “eternal sister,” being described in maternal terms.
38 Sophocles, Antigone, 471.
39 Sophocles, Antigone, 851–852.
36
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dead even in life, as she tells Ismene and Creon that “already my soul is dead.”40
Her living entombment performatively realizes this by lodging her in a physical
representation of the state of exception, the zone of indistinction in which homo
sacer dwells. Between life and death, neither living nor dead, both alive and
dead, Antigone exemplifies homo sacer who, Agamben writes, “exists on a
threshold that belongs neither to the world of the living nor to the world of the
dead: he is a living dead man.”41 In this sense, she shares this zone of
indistinction in which life and death pass in and through one another with Karen
Quinlan, the overcomatose woman whom Agamben considers, noting that she,
like Antigone, exists in what he calls “a zone of indetermination in which the
words ‘life’ and ‘death’ had lost their meaning,” so that her existence, like
Antigone’s, is “no longer life, but rather death in motion.”42 These two women
dwell in a threshold that marks the mortal limit of being, in which “life,”
“death,” and “the human” are decided. They remain in this threshold, exposed.
But Antigone’s exemplary status as a manifestation of homo sacer comes undone,
for she is as enigmatic as she is paradigmatic vis-à-vis homo sacer. She does
indeed embody and perform a living death, dwelling in a zone of indistinction
between life and death (as well as between human and animal) both positionally
in her living entombment and ontologically in her self-declaration of being deadin-life. Such a performative embodiment seems, therefore, to epitomize homo
sacer and bare life or sacred life. Therein lies the problem: given her context,
Antigone cannot live bare life. Her life cannot become bare life, and she cannot,
strictly speaking, become homo sacer. Life becomes bare life and a political
subject becomes homo sacer through, in Agamben’s words, “an inclusive
exclusion (an exceptio) of zoē in the polis,” one that is definitive since “in Western
politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds
the city of men.”43 With this, Agamben uncovers and exposes the impasse:
sexual difference. Bare life’s inclusive exclusion founds “the city of men,” which
reveals that bare life and homo sacer are sexually marked—and sexually exclusive,
for men only. In this ancient Greek context, the polis remains a male domain, of
men and for men, while women stay confined to the oikos. Agamben
acknowledges this in writing that “in the classical world...simple natural life [zoē]
is excluded from the polis in the strict sense, and remains confined—as merely
reproductive life—to the sphere of the oikos.”44 Accordingly, Antigone’s sexed
confinement to the oikos precludes her from entry in the polis. This, in turn,
precludes her from the possibility of bare life or sacred life, which becomes
sacred—or is made sacred—by a sovereign’s (bio)political decision and
pronouncement of “sacer esto,” a speech act that produces bare life as the originary

Sophocles, Antigone, 559.
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 99; see also 100 and 105.
42 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 164, 186; see also 159.
43 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7.
44 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 2. In his own way, G.W.F. Hegel repeats this sentiment in his
analysis of ethical life in Phenomenology of Spirit. See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of
Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), esp. 263–289. I
consider Hegel’s reading of Antigone at greater length elsewhere.
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act of (bio)political sovereignty. Thanks to this production, which includes bare
life by doubly excluding it from human law (vis-à-vis homicide) and divine law
(vis-à-vis sacrifice), life becomes sovereignly sacralized as bare life, placing it in a
zone of indistinction between zoē and bios.
This production does not take place in Antigone’s exceptional case since her
sexual difference as a woman disallows it from the outset. Antigone’s zoē never
enters the polis and, therefore, is never sovereignly pronounced sacred and never
politicized as bare life. Zoē must be within the polis, “the city of men,” for it to
qualify for exclusion of any sort, including the inclusive exclusion that
characterizes homo sacer and bare life. It must be in the polis for the sovereign to
be able to pronounce “sacer esto,” making it sacred in an act that also decisively
pronounces on its humanity: to be declared sacred, to become homo sacer, entails
“living” in a zone in which the designations “human” and “animal” become
indistinguishable and therefore meaningless. But Antigone cannot even make it
that far since her entry into the polis is foreclosed by her sexual difference as a
woman. Her zoē cannot be politicized, which means that she cannot be declared
sacred, which means that she cannot be determined as human. In this way,
Antigone remains inescapably inhuman. As Agamben tellingly states, “in the
‘politicization’ of bare life—the metaphysical task par excellence—the humanity of
living man is decided.”45 This assertion leaves Antigone with no hope of or
home in humanity: her life can be neither politicized nor sacralized, and she is
not a man, much less a living man given her ontologically fragile position
between life and death. Even this requires amendation if, for Agamben, politics
does become first philosophy because as a woman, Antigone is apolitical and
unpoliticizable.46 She is not and cannot be homo sacer. She is instead an inhuman
enigma—a monster.
The chorus explicitly confirms her monstrosity—and, quite tellingly, does so
immediately following its Ode to Man in Antigone’s first stasimon.47 This ode is
just that: an ode to man as a sexed being. It also serves as an inaugural
articulation of occidental humanism, praising the wonder that is anthrōpos, who
is able to subdue the goddess Earth by undertaking agriculture and thereby
taking control of the earth. But in the choral hymn, the sexually undetermined
anthrōpos quickly morphs into the explicitly male anēr, as the chorus lauds, “he is
Man, and he is cunning, / he has invented ways to take control” of beasts and of
women, bringing both of these “animals” under his yoke.48 That this hymn to
humanism is sexuate, collapsing “human” into “man,” is unsurprising yet
revealing, for it exposes the sexed nature of humanism as it develops in
occidental contexts—up to and including the humanism that haunts Agamben’s
figuration of homo sacer. This adds to the reasons why Antigone is peremptorily
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 8 (cited above).
For the relation of ontology and first philosophy, see Agamben, The Open, 79.
47 “Monstrous [τέρας]” is the first word that the chorus utters after it concludes its ode
and Antigone appears on stage before it. See Sophocles, Antigone, 376; see also 5.
48 Sophocles, Antigone, 347–348; see also 333 for the sexed, terministic contrast between
anthrōpos (ἀνθρωBος) and anēr (ἀνήρ).
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prohibited from realizing and embodying humanity as well as foreclosed from
the possibility of becoming homo sacer in any full sense.
Furthermore, Antigone is not and cannot be homo sacer because she inverts the
formulation that Agamben adopts from Pompeius Festus, according to which
homo sacer may be killed but may not be sacrificed (with “may” signifying both
potentiality and permissibility). Antigone, however, may not be killed—and for
religious reasons, namely, to avoid miasma, or pollution, which invokes a
religious dichotomy between purity and impurity. Instead of killing her, Creon
buries Antigone (in his words) “alive underground, in a grave of stone,” leaving
her “only as much food as religious law prescribes, / so that the city will not be
cursed for homicide.”49 With this, Creon explicitly subordinates the civil order to
religious law so as to avoid the punishment for violating this latter law, which in
this case concerns homicide. Antigone may not be killed according to religious
law, which also prescribes how much food she receives—a prescription that
Creon follows, thereby crossing religious and civil spheres and, in the process,
abandoning Agamben’s insistence on sacrality (and humanity) as originarily
political and pre-religious. In this case, such an originary position turns out to be
untenable, for religious law precedes and exceeds human law in Creon’s
sovereign judgment concerning Antigone’s (bio)political existence (or, more
precisely, her lack thereof).
Antigone, therefore, may not be killed thanks to a religious legal prohibition, but
she may be sacrificed (or, perhaps, “sacrificed”) in a sense, for her living
entombment enacts a kind of sacrifice of Antigone for the self-preserving sake of
the polis. This sacrifice or quasi-sacrifice takes place for political rather than
religious reasons, giving Antigone a symbolic death (as ultimately inhuman)
rather than a physical death. In doing so, it further establishes Antigone’s
threshold position between living and dying. Moreover, this politically
motivated quasi-sacrifice engenders a “real,” corporeal sacrifice: Antigone’s selfsacrifice, a possibility for which Agamben’s conception of homo sacer makes no
provisions. Antigone finally stands not as a homo sacer, a sacred man, but as an
unsacralized and inhuman woman who lacks (bio)political existence; instead of
one who may be killed but may not be sacrificed, Antigone may not be killed
(even by the sovereign) but may be and is sacrificed—twice, in political and
symbolic and then in corporeal and mortal terms.
Only Antigone can ultimately affirm her living and dying, just as, in her context,
only Antigone affirms Caputo’s assertion that “life is sacred stuff”—that the
fragile “stuff” of life as well as of humanity bears incalculable value that no
exclusively political decision can figure. In her context, only Antigone embraces
“sacred” as a vital and ambivalent marker of difference, crystallized for her in
and through her sexual difference as a woman (as well as her threshold status
between “human” and “animal” and between life and death), for this is the
difference that stands as potentially fatal for the life (such as it is) of homo sacer.
Antigone, thanks to her difference, instead remains open to the “sacred stuff” of
49

Sophocles, Antigone, 774, 775–776.
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human life in all of its fragility and weakness. Antigone remains open to and
listens for the call of—the call that is—human.

WILLIAM ROBERT is a Humanities Postdoctoral Faculty Fellow in the Department of
Religion at Syracuse University. His first book, Trials: Of Humanity and Divinity, is
forthcoming from Fordham University Press.

© William Robert. All rights reserved.
Robert, William. “Human, Life, and Other Sacred Stuff,” in Journal for Cultural
and Religious Theory vol. 10 no. 1 (Winter 2009): 64-80.

JCRT 10.1 (2009)

